We study how two distinct types of pre-entry experience -core technological experience and market-based complementary experience -affect post-entry performance in a new industry. We focus on the fit between capabilities generated through pre-entry experience and the preferences of heterogeneous consumer segments. Specifically, we suggest that firms with pre-entry experience in the focal technology will attract more valuable consumers, but as these consumers typically make adoption decisions early the firm must enter early to benefit. Conversely, firms with pre-entry experience in the focal market will attract a larger share of less valuable consumers regardless of entry timing. Our empirical analysis of the global 2G mobile telecommunications industry supports our theory and provides important insights for research on experience and entry dynamics in hightechnology industries.
INTRODUCTION
Firms often enter a new industry or market with different experiences (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002) . Recent strategy research has focused on pre-entry experience as a driver of post-entry performance in new industries. The presumption is that pre-entry experience results in the accumulation of resources, capabilities, and knowledge (technical, market and operating) that may affect post-entry performance (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Eggers, 2013; Klepper & Simons, 2000) .
Not all experience, however, has the same effect on the firm's resources and capabilities (Sosa, 2013) . Different types of experience lead to different resources, and different pre-entry resources appeal to different consumer segments depending on the fit between resources and consumer preferences. For example, a firm with strong pre-entry technological experience may not generate a post-entry advantage if consumers don't care about technological sophistication. If only a portion of the market values technological sophistication, then the firm will have an advantage only in that segment. This example highlights the need to consider the contingent value of pre-entry experience (Franco, Sarkar, Agarwal & Echambadi, 2009 ).
We consider contingencies that affect the firm's ability to capitalize on pre-entry expereince by building on the classic distinction between core and complementary resources. This distinction was articulated by Teece (1986) and further discussed in Helfat and Lieberman's (2002) consideration of different aspects of pre-entry experience. Core resources "refer to knowledge that fundamentally underlies and is required to create a product or service" (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002: 732) , and include technical and consumer knowledge (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000) . Complementary resources are those that facilitate the commercialization of products and services, including marketing, manufacturing and distribution resources (Tripsas, 1997; Rothaermel, 2001; Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006) . In dynamic, technology-intensive markets, we argue that core resources result from previous experience with the same technology in different geographical markets, and are likely to drive a " 2" firm's ability to appeal to technology-friendly consumers (typically early adopters). By contrast, complementary resources spring from previous experience in the same geographical market with a different technology, and include brand awareness and distribution capabilities that help firms attract brand-oriented consumers (typically late adopters). We propose a simple model where heterogeneous consumer segments adopt an innovation at different times and want different things from firms, while firms have different capabilities and resources based on their pre-entry experience.
We propose that firms should enter with a strategy (timing and positioning) that capitalizes on the fit between consumer preferences and firm capabilities based on their heterogeneous capabilities.
We study this model of pre-entry experience and performance in global 2G mobile telecommunications markets. In line with our theory about the importance of fit between resources and market demands, we find that firms with pre-entry experience in 2G elsewhere (core experience) can successfully attract high-usage consumers, but only if they enter early enough to claim (and keep) these consumers, who typically are early adopters. Post-hoc analysis suggests that this is because prior technological experience enables firms to learn about targeting and appealing to the most profitable consumers in the market. Firms with prior domestic fixed line telecom experience (complementary experience) possess resources that help attract a larger share of comparatively less intensive users. Our post-hoc analyses suggest that while these domestic firms might benefit simply by being local as opposed to competing multinationals, the true value of complementary experience in our context is tied to the reuse of a domestically valuable brand name and reputation.
Our key contribution involves untangling the roles of different types of pre-entry experience for post-entry performance. Specifically, we show that technical or operating knowledge (core) increases knowledge of how consumers interact with the technology, which can lead to an increased ability to attract early adopting, high quality users provided that they enter early. This can be applicable in settings where firms create relatively self-contained geographic operations as they " 3" expand, such as banking, automobiles, and retail. We also show that domestic experience (complementary) provides firms with a usable brand to encourage adoption by more skeptical consumers and increase overall market share. This finding may be relevant wherever established domestic incumbents in one product or service face competition from foreign multinational entrants in a new and related product market. Thus, both core and complementary experience can lead to outcomes beneficial for the firm, but they do so in entirely different ways based on differences in the fit between the potential value created by those experiences and the preferences of heterogeneous consumer groups. We also contribute to three other aspects of organizational research. First, we integrate the literature on internationalization more clearly into the literature on pre-entry experience, and we suggest important implications for future research in the literature on internationalization. Second, we contribute to a relatively small stream of literature on entry dynamics in mobile telecommunications, which is a vital and sizable global industry. Third, we make a methodological contribution by utilizing a two-step empirical approach that can be fruitful for rigorous study of time-invariant factors such as pre-entry experience and entry timing.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
There is a growing literature in strategy on pre-entry experience and post-entry performance in new industries. Helfat & Lieberman (2002) argue that pre-entry experience makes firms differ in their capabilities, resources, and knowledge. Early research on pre-entry experience focused on competitive differences between entrants and incumbents (Henderson, 1993) . The argument was that incumbents possessed the advantage if the experience-based resources they controlled retained value (Tripsas, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) . More recent research has focused on the preentry experience of de alio or diversifying entrants, who often accumulated pre-entry experience in different contexts (de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2007; Sosa, 2009; King & Tucci, 2002) . These studies " 4" investigate how pre-entry experience augmented the firm's resource stock and complementary assets in ways that affected post-entry performance in the new market.
We extend this research by carefully distinguishing -both theoretically and empiricallybetween different types of pre-entry experience. Firms with different types of pre-entry experience accumulate different types of resources and knowledge (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Eggers, 2012) , so it is important to consider the implications of heterogeneous experience types among entrants in the same market space. An intuitive way to classify pre-entry experience is based on the classic Ansoff matrix (Ansoff, 1957) , where the firm introduces a new product to an existing market (thus building on market knowledge) or an existing product to a new market (thus building on operational knowledge). Analogously, Teece (1986) makes the distinction between operating experience with the focal technology leading to "core" resources, and experience in the focal market leading to "complementary" resources. Clearly, different aspects of core or complementary experience may matter. For example, the possession of core experience may help a firm be more innovative, it may increase operational performance, or it may simply reflect that the firm is a geographically diversified organization. We decompose and evaluate how different aspects of core or complementary experience affect post-entry performance.
In considering the effect of pre-entry experience, it is helpful to consider the extent to which capabilities accumulated through experience fits the needs and wants of different consumer segments (Adner 2002; Adner and Zemsky 2006) . Intuitively, for pre-entry experience to be useful in a new market or industry, the resulting capabilities must be valued and applicable in the new market (Danneels 2007; Tripsas 1997) . Thus, recognizing and exploiting the fit between pre-entry organizational experience and preferences of heterogeneous consumer segments is a key aspect to the creation of competitive advantage. Firms increase performance when they adopt strategies capitalizing on their pre-entry capabilities, and our goal is to uncover some of the strategic " 5" contingencies that affect performance. Research on innovation diffusion divides adopters into categories based on when they adopt the innovation and what factors they find most relevant in making adoption decisions (Karshenas & Stoneman, 1999; Rogers, 1995) . We draw on research on consumer heterogeneity and the fit with the firm's pre-entry experience to generate novel hypotheses about the role of different types of pre-entry experience for firm performance.
Core Pre-Entry Experience: Technological Knowledge and Multinationals
In line with Teece (1986) and others, we consider core experience and resources as those accumulated within a focal technological paradigm. To be "pre-entry" experience, this core experience must be accumulated in a different market space. Typically, this market space is geographically different, where the firm sequentially rolls out the focal technology in different countries or regions. This is consistent with Helfat & Lieberman's (2002) view of "different geographic location" as a key distinction among types of experience (p. 729), and is a central component to the literature on internationalization. In that literature, one of the central concepts is that firms accumulate knowledge (often technological) in their home market that subsequently facilitates their entry as competitors into other countries (Teece, 1977; Kogut & Zander, 1993) .
Firms with distinctive technological knowledge frequently benefit from internationalization (Mitchell, Shaver & Yeung, 1992; Mork & Yeung, 1991) , as the expansion takes full advantage of unconstrained resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004) . The central argument is that pre-entry experience with the focal technology builds capabilities that can be brought to the new geography.
These capabilities derived from technological experience may take different forms. First, by definition, firms that have previously implemented a given technology in other countries are multinational firms. These firms may possess advantages based on international reputation, economies of scale, and multinational experience. Such resources might affect post-entry " 6" performance, but are not necessarily derived from the relevant technological experience of the firm.
We therefore seek to control for these potentially confounding effects empirically as discussed in Section 5.3.1. Second, prior technological experience implies an understanding of the focal technology, which may allow firms to be more innovative. Klepper & Simons (2000) show that related pre-entry experience led to increased innovative capabilities in the transition from radio to television. Work in disk drives shows that firms consistently stay at the technological frontier across multiple generations of disk drives, resulting in better performance (Franco, et. al., 2009; King & Tucci, 2002) . Sosa (2009) showed how pre-entry experience in different, but closely related pharmaceutical arenas helped firms entering the anti-cancer drug market be more productive in their R&D. Thus, technological experience may increase capabilities for innovation. Third, firms with core pre-entry experience accumulate important information about how consumers interact with the technology, which improves understanding of the needs and wants of consumers with respect to the technology (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000) . Such an understanding of consumer desires has long been a key aspect of success in the marketing literature (Slater & Narver, 2000; Grossman, 1998) .
Knowledge of consumer desires and of how consumers interact with the technology can help the firm identify profitable consumer segments and aid in targeting those consumers.
If pre-entry experience drives capabilities as described above, it is important to consider how these capabilities fit with the preferences of different consumer segments based on adoption timing.
First, work on the diffusion of innovation suggests that early adopters are more technologically sophisticated and technology-oriented (Rogers, 1995; Agarwal & Prasad, 1998) , and thus would be drawn to a firm with higher innovative capabilities. Second, the population of early adopters is relatively small in empirical diffusion models. The diffusion literature (e.g., Rogers, 1995) finds that the share of consumers focused on technological features and being at the technological frontier is small; later adopting groups are referred to as "early majority" and "late majority".
Third, early adopters of a technology often place a higher value on the technology, primarily because they use it more intensively. Research on innovation adoption posits that early adopters are willing to purchase before the technology's success is assured (Cabral 1990; Cabral, Salant and Woroch 1999; Farrell and Saloner 1986; Kretschmer 2008) . Rogers (1995, pp. 269-270) cites early adopters as having more education, greater social status and mobility -all factors related to wealth (and implicitly willingness to pay). This implies that, from the firm's perspective, early adopters will be higher quality users, as the firm can charge more for the initial purchase or charge higher usage rates. In our empirical context, Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) show that average 2G mobile phone usage declines as more users join a network, suggesting that early adopters use 2G most intensively. This is in line with the "rank effect" in diffusion, where consumers adopt a new technology earlier if they place a higher value on the technology (Karshenas & Stoneman, 1999) . Related to this, marketing practitioners suggest that consumers that have been with the firm longest are generally the most profitable (Reichheld and Sasser 1990; Zeithaml, Rust and Lemon 2001 ).
Thus we argue that firms with pre-entry experience with the focal technology in a different geography possess technical capabilities and knowledge of consumer needs that help them attract a specific consumer segment, presuming they adequately implement strategies capitalizing on these capabilities. The target consumer segment is likely to (a) be a small share of the long-term market, (b) use the new technology more intensively than other segments, and (c) make adoption decisions earlier in the technology's life cycle than other segments. The first two points paint the picture of a small group of high quality consumers that firms with appropriate pre-entry experience may be especially suited to attract. The third aspect highlights an important strategic choice the firm must make to secure this small group of high quality users -namely entering early to be present when these consumers make adoption decisions. Entering too late may make it difficult to attract consumers who have already made adoption decisions. Jointly, this leads to our first two hypotheses: 
Complementary Pre-Entry Experience: Domestic Firms and Brands
We define complementary pre-entry experience as experience in the focal geographical market and with the same consumers, but using a different technology. Such experience helps firms accumulate complementary assets, which facilitate the commercialization of subsequent technologies (Teece, 1986) , and include consumer awareness, brand names, marketing and distribution organizations, customer service activities and other competences (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002) . There is a wide literature on the accumulation and importance of complementary assets and knowledge.
For example, Tripsas (1997) shows how typesetting companies facing technological transitions that destroyed the value of their complementary assets were slow to transition from the old to the new, while these firms could easily cope with changes that preserved the value of complementary assets. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) discuss how the possession or lack of key complementary assets has important implications for decisions about licensing out technological innovations.
Broadly speaking, there are three ways in which resources accumulated through complementary pre-entry experience may improve performance. First, firms with experience in the focal market possess existing consumer relationships and information, in large part by being domestic firms (in contrast to multinational competitors) and having existing consumer relationships. This includes information rents about the details of specific consumers, as well as the ability to bundle existing products with new ones (Stremersch & Tellis, 2002; Adams & Yellen, 1976) . Second, complementary experience can generate brand names, brand loyalty, and consumer awareness that encourage adoption (Nerkar & Roberts, 2004) . This relates to the idea of brand extensions (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994; Völckner & Sattler, 2006) . Third, complementary pre-entry experience may generate distribution assets that ease commercialization (Rothaermel, 2001) .
Returning to differences between early and late adopters of a new technology (Mahajan, Muller and Srivastava 1990; Rogers 1995) , late adopters may be uncertain of a new technology's benefits and more cautious in their adoption decisions (Taylor & Todd, 1995) . They are more likely to adopt when offered a familiar and trusted brand name, as comfort and trust in the provider are important adoption determinants (Pavlou, 2003) . Later adopter groups are also typically significantly larger than early adopter groups -the "mass" of the market. This is supported by work showing that brand names primarily provide advantages in terms of market share (Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 1986; Brown and Lattin 1994) .
Thus, strong brands and other complementary assets in the context of a new technology may appeal to a group of adopters that (a) is significantly larger than the early adopter group, and (b) adopts later. Thus, our hypothesis on complementary pre-entry market experience is:
H3: Firms with complementary pre-entry experience will attract a higher quantity of users than firms without such experience.
We do not hypothesize that complementary experience will benefit late entrants more than early ones. The logic for H2 suggests that firms must be active when the consumers that value their specific pre-entry experience make adoption decisions. Given that complementary experience helps firms attract consumers that adopt relatively later, these firms may enter either early or late to be present when their segment adopts. It may be inefficient and unprofitable for these firms to incur the costs associated with entering early, but from a revenue perspective (which we focus on) it should not matter when these firms enter.
THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Our empirical setting is the global second generation (2G) mobile telecommunications industry. Mobile telecommunications, and specifically the launch of 2G networks, has been one of " 10" the most successful and economically significant technology introductions in recent decades.
1 The rollout of 2G networks began in Finland in 1991, and continued on a country-by-country basis through the 1990s and early 2000s. These 2G networks often focused on business consumers initially, but quickly grew to include mass-market consumers as well.
For our study, the heterogeneity among 2G operators in various countries is particularly interesting. Our sample features many firms with pre-entry telecommunications experience in the focal country through fixed line (copper and fiber) systems. While 2G was technologically different from fixed line, domestic experience provided firms with an established brand name and consumer relationships that they could extend to 2G. In addition, many multinational firms (e.g., Telefonica, British Telecom, NTT DoCoMo) created 2G networks in multiple countries over time, leveraging their core technological experience to move into new geographical markets. As discussed in Section 4, these differences define our measures of core and complementary experience.
Government involvement in the industry allows for a clear definition of early and late entrants. Market structure in a country was typically determined by the government granting licenses to a fixed number of operators, with additional entrants sometimes granted subsequent licenses.
In terms of consumers, there are two important points. First, mobile phone users make two decisions: they decide to adopt a mobile phone or not, and they make (more or less) continuous usage decisions. This presents us with at least two channels for firm-level advantages: some firms may be good at attracting a large volume of subscribers, and some firms may be successful at attracting high-quality users (those that use their phones more). Second, prior research on 2G mobile telephony shows that early adopters tend to be heavy users (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009 ).
This aligns with prior research on the diffusion of innovations, where early adopters place a higher """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""" 1 "This contrasts with 1G (analog) mobile networks launched in many countries in the 1980s. 1G networks generally targeted business consumers, had very low penetration rates, and did not operate long enough before the emergence of 2G (digital) networks to ever be profitable."
value on the new product. Thus, given per-consumer costs in terms of consumer acquisition, billing, and service combined with the fact that consumers run up bills based on minutes used per month, high-usage consumers are an attractive and profitable segment.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
We draw our data predominantly from two sources used in previous studies (Genakos and Valletti 2011 , Koski and Kretschmer 2005 , Grajek and Kretschmer 2009 , 2012 We also use IMF's International Financial Statistics (for GDP) and World Bank's World Development Indicators (for population, telephone mainlines, and average cost of a local call). As the latter only provides yearly data, we linearly interpolated the variables to arrive at quarterly data.
3
We also gather data on firm structure, ownership, and mobile and fixed brands to assess whether firms had access to knowledge from previous entries or incumbency through major shareholders and if it was using the same brand for fixed and mobile operations. These data were drawn from company histories, news reports, and prior research on the evolution of the 2G industry (Noam & Singhal, 1996) . The authors and a research assistant collected data on firm experience, and resolved any uncertainty by group evaluation. In the case of firms with multiple investors, we considered an """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
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investor's prior experience relevant if the investor owned 25% or more of the firm, which is generally considered the cutoff between financial and strategic investments.
Our dataset features quarterly data on 90 mobile phone network operators in 30 countries from the fourth quarter of 1998 through the second quarter of 2004. All measures are at the SBU (i.e., firm-country) level. Our two dependent variables are average usage on each operator's network (Minutes of use, MoU) and number of subscribers as a share of the country's population (CellSubs).
To capture pre-entry experience, we begin our initial analysis with relatively coarse variables to capture the most significant effects, though our ex-post analyses will utilize more fine-grained measures. We first construct a set of dummy variables indicating if a firm had prior experience with 2G in other countries, or was a fixed-line incumbent in the focal country. We code prior 2G
experience as core technological pre-entry experience (CoreExp). We code prior domestic fixed line telecommunications experience as complementary pre-entry experience (ComplExp). If a firm was among the first firms to offer service in a country, we tag them as an early entrant (EarlyEntrant).
4
Variable definitions for all variables and descriptives are reported in Table 1 , and a correlation matrix is in the Appendix. have rolled out 2G services in at least one market before. Representative firms include Vodafone in """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""" followed by the domestic fixed-line firms with 2G experience (45%). The other two quadrants see slightly lower percentages of early entrants, 38% and 41%. Hence, firms with the most relevant resources tended to enter earlier, but there is enough variation in entry timing across subpopulations to suggest that entry timing is relatively orthogonal to the different pre-entry experience types.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We focus on two dependent variables -usage (MoU) and penetration (CellSubs). However, the decision to subscribe to a network and how many minutes to use are connected, and the endogeneity between the two makes it difficult to cleanly identify the effect of firm-level (timeinvariant) variables on these outcomes. Econometric approaches that include both time-varying and time-invariant predictor variables (e.g., standard OLS or panel models with random effects) cannot adequately address both endogeneity and important differences between firms. We therefore utilize a two-step approach. First, we use two simultaneous equations with instrumental variables to build models of penetration and usage that include time-varying predictors as well as time-invariant firmspecific effects. Second, as our primary variables of interest (CoreExp, ComplExp and EarlyEntrant) are time-invariant, we extract the firm-specific effects from the step and use them as dependent variables in the second step. This lets us address concerns about endogeneity and simultaneity in the first step, and investigate time-invariant effects in the second. This two-step approach is both convenient and necessary because the coefficients on any time-invariant variables are not identified in the first step of our analysis given we use firm-specific effects. More detail and results are below.
First Step: A Model of Usage and Subscriptions
In the first step of our analysis (used to derive firm-level effects on usage and penetration for further analysis), we use a simultaneous-equation model to investigate the nature of performance based on pre-entry experience and entry timing: 
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where i, j, and t refer to country, mobile network operator, and time, respectively. Equation (1) (2), which explains the share of subscribers to a given operator of the total population in the country, is specified analogously. We allow the error terms ε ijt and ζ ijt to be heterogeneous and possibly correlated. Thus, the subscription and usage of mobile phones by consumers may be a joint decision influenced by the same missing factors in both equations.
Equations (1) and (2) contain lagged dependent variables, which lets us compare carriers at different stages of the diffusion process, and operator-specific fixed effects, which lets us control for unobserved (in this stage) heterogeneity among firms. We use the estimation method by Arellano and Bond (1991) , which delivers consistent estimates under the assumption of no serial correlation in the error term and is routinely used for models with lagged dependent variables and fixed effects.
We instrument for prices, network sizes, and prepay share, as they may be endogenous in both equations, as discussed in more detail in the Appendix. The goal of these equations is to obtain operator-specific effects, which we then regress on our measures of pre-entry experience and entry """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
5 These effects are often referred to as fixed effects, as they are invariant across time.
"
16" timing in Section 5.2. 6 Table 2 presents regression results of mobile phone usage and penetration equations (1) and (2). The test statistics for the Arellano-Bond AR(2) and the Hansen J tests of overidentifying restrictions are not significant, giving us confidence in our instruments.
The results in Table 2 are not the focus of this study, as we use these regressions to obtain operator-specific effects further investigated in Section 5.2. It is however worth briefly looking at the results. Lagged dependent variables are strong predictors in both equations confirming inertia in both usage and subscription choices. Own price and network size are negative and significant in the usage equation, as expected. The latter effect can be explained by less heavy users joining as the network grows, consistent with Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) . The coefficient on price of other operators (negative and significant at the 10% level) provides some evidence of complementarity in usage of mobile phones across networks. This can be explained by reciprocity: users tend to call back after being called. Prepay share and GDP are also significant and have the expected signsnegative and positive, respectively-in the usage equation. Own price is not statistically significant in the penetration equation and GDP is actually negative and significant. One explanation is that since operator-specific effects account for a large part of cross-sectional variation in the data, the timeseries variation in GDP and prices is not enough to generate the expected effect. What the GDP variable may capture in the penetration equation is that diffusion in richer countries (with corresponding lower changes in GDP per capita over time) is faster than in poorer countries.
Experimentation with other functional forms of the GDP variable does not alter our results.
Average usage intensity is positive (at the 10% significance level) in the penetration equation: high-"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
6 Note that because we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation, which involves first-differencing of the estimated equations (1) and (2), we cannot estimate the operator-specific effects or a coefficient on any time-invariant variable including pre-entry experience. We can, however, recover the operator-specific effects by comparing actual values of MoU and CellSubs with the predicted ones based on the estimates of δ's, γ's, φ's and ρ's in equations (1) and (2).
17" intensity users may be more influential than low-intensity users in fueling mobile phone subscriptions, consistent with network effects being important for less technology-savvy subscribers.
Second Step: How Firm-Level Experience Affects Usage and Subscriptions
To address our theoretical questions, we are primarily interested in the operator-specific effects from equations (1) and (2), and the relationships between these effects and our set of firm experience and entry timing variables. Before looking at those regressions, it is helpful to see the distribution of the effects visually. These are shown in Figures 2a (for (Figure 2b ). Clearly however, these are just descriptive observations that we will subject to a rigorous empirical test in the second part of our analysis.
----------INSERT FIGURES 2A AND 2B ABOUT HERE ----------
To investigate these observations in more detail, we regress the operator-specific effects on our set of core and complementary experience and entry timing dummies and report the results in Table 3 . We also include a dummy for a firm operating in a country that entered 2G early to capture country differences stemming from the timing of the rollout of the technology. We find that this coefficient is positive and significant in the penetration regressions, suggesting that countries that launched 2G first have the highest market potential. The usage regressions show that CoreExp is not significant, suggesting that there is no linear effect of core experience on usage intensity, which does not confirm H1. However, the interaction term of core experience and early entry (EarlyEntrant*CoreExp) is positive and significant in the usage regression (3) and the linear " 18" coefficient on early entry becomes insignificant. This suggests that core experience only benefits firms that enter the market early, in line with H2. Hence, H1 only holds for firms with core preentry experience that enter early, while H2 is confirmed through the significant interaction term.
----------INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ----------
Further, we find that while the EarlyEntrant*CoreExp interaction is positive and significant in regression (3), the interaction is negative and significant in the penetration equation (6). Accordingly, core pre-entry experience only provides a benefit in attracting a smaller segment of more valuable consumers. These results are explored in more detail in Sections 5.3 and 6.
H3 suggests that the effect of complementary experience would appear in the penetration equation. In regression (4), ComplExp has a positive and significant effect on penetration, while in regression (1) it has no effect on usage. Complementary pre-entry experience thus increases market share, but does not affect the quality of a firm's user base. This supports H3.
Further Analyses: Mechanisms Driving the Results
Our results show that pre-entry experience indeed plays a different role depending on whether it refers to core or complementary experience, and provide support for H2 and H3. Preentry experience with 2G networks elsewhere helped firms attract higher-usage consumers if they entered early enough to target these consumers, while pre-entry experience in the same geographical market helped firms attract more users. The explanatory variables in our first step regressions let us rule out some explanations for these findings. For example, by controlling for price in equations (1) and (2) we exclude the possibility that the effect of core technical experience simply allows firms to charge a higher price than their competitors. Similarly, we can rule out the argument that strategic decisions about pre-pay services or network size might be the means by which firms with core and complementary experiences achieve higher performance. When developing the hypotheses,
however, we acknowledged that there are still multiple mechanisms that may generate these results.
We exploit in-depth industry information and additional data to study these mechanisms.
Core Technological Experience (Prior 2G Experience)
For core experience, proxied by 2G experience in a different country, three mechanisms could lead to the relationship we found. First, our 2G experience variable may simply identify large multinationals, and their advantage may be unrelated to our theoretical arguments. Second, technological knowledge accumulated through pre-entry 2G experience abroad might allow firms to be more innovative (Klepper & Simons, 2000; Franco, et. al., 2009) . Third, such experience might help firms identify consumer needs and target attractive consumers (Slater & Narver, 2000) .
To address the issue on multinationals, we limited our analysis to the large multinational firms in our sample (e.g., Verizon, T-Mobile, Telefonica). All of these firms enter at least two countries with 2G networks, so they have at least one observation in the data where they possess prior 2G experience and one observation where they do not. The results, shown in regressions (1) and (5) of Table 4 , are very similar to the original results, suggesting that the benefits of prior 2G experience and entering early exist even for firms that are similar in their international operations.
----------INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ----------
The second explanation -that 2G experience makes firms more innovative -cannot be ruled out in our specific context, but could manifest in limited ways. As we study only 2G competition (not competition between 2G and 3G), we are comparing theoretically standardized products across countries. Some countries featured network coverage competition, such as the U.S.
where comparative network coverage maps have been a key feature of advertising campaigns. But in many other countries in our sample, rollout was relatively homogenous. Also, handsets could generally be used across networks in most countries (the U.S. is again an exception), which limited the ability to differentiate based on handsets. Excluding countries like the U.S. (where large " 20" geographic areas made network competition more prevalent, or where handsets were specific to a given carrier) produces similar results (available from the authors).
The third mechanism -that prior 2G experience helps firms target the most attractive consumers and markets -is more amenable to empirical investigation in our context. One part of this story is that prior 2G experience in other countries helped firms realize that some consumers would use their phones intensively, while other consumers might use them very little and thus might be less profitable for the firm to service. The distribution of the usage fixed effects by country (available from the authors) show strong cross-country differences -consumers in some countries (e.g., Portugal, Czech Republic and Hungary) used their phones much more than consumers in others (e.g., Canada, Argentina and Australia). Thus, prior 2G experience may have helped firms identify and target countries that were likely to possess high-usage consumers, and that they needed to enter that country early to capture those high-usage consumers. We assess this by comparing countries that experienced early entry by technologically experienced carriers with all other countries. To do this, we construct a dummy variable EarlyCoreMarket, which equals one for markets that saw early entry by at least one carrier with core experience, and zero otherwise. Then we regress the firm-specific effects of late entrants on our experience indicators and EarlyCoreMarket (regressions (2) and (6) in Table 4 ). Note that we net out the firm-specific effects of early entrants to rule out the possibility that firms are good at identifying markets in which they alone do well. The coefficient on EarlyCoreMarket is positive and significant in the usage regression (2), suggesting that prior core technological experience helps firms identify the most profitable markets with attractive consumers and to identify strategies that will allow them to capture those consumers. While further descriptive analysis suggests that early entrant firms with prior 2G experience obtain higher usage rates than other firms even within these EarlyCoreMarket countries, the difference is not statistically
significant. This suggests some indicative support for the story that these firms are also more innovative (or at least more focused in their targeting) than firms lacking prior 2G experience.
Complementary Experience (Prior In-Country Fixed Line Experience)
As with core experience, we outlined multiple ways in Section 2. We do so by exploiting the fact that some domestic fixed line firms offered 1G (analog) services before moving into 2G (digital) services, while others entered 2G directly. In general, 1G was unsuccessful given its modest penetration rates and its relatively short window of opportunity, compared with the high initial rollout costs. It also largely targeted business consumers as opposed to mass market adoption. Regression (7) in Table 4 shows that there is no relationship between our measure of 1G experience and 2G market penetration rates, and that even when we control for 1G experience our complementary experience variable is still positive and significant. Thus, it appears that in-country experience is only helpful if it is successful and large-scale.
Second, we split the firms with fixed line experience into two groups -those that used the same brand name and logo for their 2G and fixed line businesses (e.g., Verizon and AT&T in the U.S., T-Mobile in Germany; coded as SameBrand =1) and those that used different brands for each (e.g., Orange in France, Unifon in Argentina; SameBrand = 0). If the value of fixed line experience was brand-related, then only firms that used the same brand should receive the benefit. Regression (8) in Table 4 shows exactly that -the benefits of domestic telecom experience track to firms that
use the same brand in fixed line and 2G (coefficient on SameBrand positive and significant). 7 This supports the argument that the benefit of pre-entry fixed line experience in the focal country is tied to the ability to leverage a known brand name to attract consumers, and that only firms with a strategy built around an existing consumer brand can successfully leverage this type of pre-entry experience to create an advantage. It also casts doubt on the validity of alternative explanations like bundling or active cross-selling as such benefits would be available to any fixed line provider whether they used the same brand name or not (fixed and mobile operators are still considered under the same ownership in both cases). Further, most fixed line companies did not have the type of retail stores required to sell 2G services before they launched 2G networks, diminishing the likelihood that distribution assets played a significant role. Bundling, consumer information, and distribution assets may still matter for driving market share, but any effect is contingent on re-using the same brand name for fixed and mobile telephony.
Our ex-post investigations of both core and complementary experience generate insights into the sources of these effects. First, pre-entry core experience in the focal technology provides vital information to the firm about which types of consumers are actually profitable and how to target them. This leads firms to pursue markets where they can both identify and attract high-quality consumers. We expect that these firms are consciously choosing a strategy that sacrifices a larger market share of subscribers to obtain higher quality subscribers. This resembles a learning storylearning about different segments of consumers, their desires, and their relative attractiveness.
Second, pre-entry complementary experience in the domestic market provides a specific resource that attracts a large volume of consumers -an established brand name. Firms employing a strategy built around the same brand name for their fixed line and mobile businesses attract more consumers """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
7 "Interestingly,"in"the"usage"regression"(4)"the"coefficient"on"DiffBrand"is"positive"and"marginally"significant."This" may"indicate"that"firms"choosing"not"to"use"the"same"brand"may"have"done"so"specifically"because"they"wanted"to" target"techAsavvy,"more"intensive"users,"and"believed"that"their"existing"fixed"line"brand"would"hurt"this"effort."
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than fixed line firms that do not. 8 These mechanisms for core and complementary experience lend depth to our theory and empirical results, and extend our understanding of how exactly pre-entry experience affects the optimal strategies for firms to drive post-entry performance.
Robustness Checks
We implemented a number of robustness checks that we do not report to save space (all are available from the authors), but discuss briefly here. First, we excluded countries with unique characteristics. This meant excluding the U.S. alone (as the country has multiple different technological standards) and then all countries using Receiver Pays Policy (RPP, where the receiver of a call pays for minutes of usage as well). The former produces the same qualitative results, while the latter produces similar results with attenuated significance (as expected with a smaller sample and only 90 observations to begin with). Second, in some instances the same parent company owns or has a significant interest in multiple network operators, such as T-Mobile or Vodafone operating in multiple countries. To address this, we clustered standard errors at the parent company level and obtained nearly identical results. Third, we included additional interaction terms, but they were not statistically significant and had no theoretical basis.
Fourth, we investigated the possibility that the effects we found decay rapidly within each individual country and are thus unlikely to be long-term effects. To test this, we interacted some of our key variables with a measure of "time on air" for the firm to see if the effects were decaying over time. The results show no decay for usage and actually an increasing effect for penetration. Still, our time window (five years) is relatively limited, and so the effects may decay over a longer period.
Indeed, utilizing the dynamic nature of our data and constructing a system in equilibrium (i.e.
constant subscriber numbers and constant usage over time) we obtain long-term effects of prior """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""" " 24"
core experience contingent on early entry of and prior market experience. 9 We calculate the long-run usage and penetration effects to be 131.5 minutes and -0.3%, respectively, for early entrants with core experience and -53.5 minutes and 8.5% for firms with complementary experience. That is, an early entrant with core experience enjoys higher per-subscriber usage intensity of over two hours per month, but has a lower network penetration by 0.3%. Interestingly, ComplExp yields a usage longrun disadvantage of 53.5 minutes while the short term effect in Table 3 is insignificant. This disadvantage is driven by the penetration advantage of 8.5% which exerts downward pressure on average usage -later adopters are less intensive users, as shown by the negative coefficient on own subscribers in the usage equation in Table 2 .
Finally, we explore whether core and complementary experience and entry timing have different effects depending on how entrants were chosen. In other words, if entry is endogenous in the sense that "better" firms with a set of prior experience are able to enter markets early, our results might only hold for a set of countries in which the entry process rewarded such firms. We study this with data on the method of providing mobile licenses, with the idea that entrants chosen through more competitive and efficient processes (auction and comparative selection, or "beauty contest") would be more effective than those chosen by direct award. The results for usage suggest that this is indeed the case; early entrants enjoy a usage advantage if they were awarded the license through a competitive process, but not if the license was awarded directly. 10 Our main results, however, still hold after controlling for this potential source of endogeneity; i.e. early entrants with core experience have significantly higher usage intensity on their networks even after controlling for the license award mechanism. Thus, firms with core pre-entry experience can utilize their strengths better in """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
9 The derivations of the long-run effects are given in Appendix A.1. 10 Our results for market penetration are unaffected by controlling for the award procedure.
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markets with a more competitive award system, but our main results are not driven by this. We discuss the potential interpretation of these results more below.
DISCUSSION
We theoretically and empirically investigated how different types of pre-entry experience lead to different types of post-entry advantages. We did so by building on the distinction between core and complementary experience (Teece, 1986; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) and the innovation diffusion literature (Rogers, 1995) . Our central argument is that core and complementary pre-entry experience affect post-entry performance in nearly opposite ways (while not being mutually exclusive). Pre-entry experience with the focal technology increases the firm's core capabilities (Klepper and Simons, 2000; Franco, et. al., 2009 ), which in turn attracts the relatively small segment of early adopting, high quality consumers, but firms must enter early to capture this benefit. Our extended analysis shows that this effect is primarily driven by learning -firms learn which consumers are most attractive and how to target them based on their experiences in other markets.
Conversely, pre-entry experience in the domestic market increases the firm's complementary resources and knowledge (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Tripsas, 1997) , which attracts a larger segment of late adopting and lower value consumers. This is driven largely by leveraging an existing brand and consumer awareness to drive adoption. These theoretical and empirical findings contribute to prior work on pre-entry experience, demand-side research in strategy, and internationalization. We discuss these below.
In recent research, the interest in pre-entry experience has moved beyond entrants-versusincumbent dynamics to consider the notion that firms may bring relevant experience from related industries that affects post-entry outcomes (Sosa, 2013; Ganco & Agarwal, 2009) . We push this line of reasoning further -depending on the type of a firm's pre-entry experience, the implications will be different. We show how distinguishing between core and complementary experience has Our findings on core and complementary pre-entry likely have broad -but not unlimitedgeneralizability. In terms of technological experience, our finding that this conveys advantages for attracting higher quality users obviously depends on firms' ability to deploy the same specific technology or product in another market previously. This has long been the focus of the internationalization literature, which has investigated internationalization in semiconductor plants (Salomon & Martin, 2008) , medical equipment facilities (Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung, 1992) , and manufacturing firms (Henisz and Delios, 2001 ). We would expect that any industry that features some degree of geographic competition could display multinational patterns of expansion similar to the telecommunications industry, where differences in national policies (e.g., banking, telecommunications, health care) or high transportation costs (e.g., automobiles or steel) might lead firms to open multiple smaller facilities instead of a single global operation. For market-based experience, we focus empirically on experience in a prior technological generation, but our findings essentially revolve around the possession of a reusable and recognizable brand name. Such a brand name need not result from a prior generational technology (e.g., radio to television, bicycles to motorcycles, mainframes to personal computers), but could be from a closely related product space, such as the way that Disney has grown from movies and television into theme parks and cruise lines.
While the marketing literature places a great deal of attention on consumers and segmentation, there is less attention in strategy on the role played by consumers in creating firmlevel advantages. This study adds a different perspective to existing work on consumer heterogeneity and the implications for competitive advantage (Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Adner & Snow, 2010) . We " 27"
emphasize that the degree of fit between the knowledge and resources of the organization and the preferences of distinct consumer segments drives which consumers firms will attract and how successful they will be in profiting from those consumer segments. Future work identifying heterogeneity in firm-level strategies should more clearly identify heterogeneous consumer segments and their implications for strategy and competitive advantage.
Our results also suggest that prior 2G experience has a negative relationship with market share. The most obvious explanation for this effect is the "liability of foreignness" (Zaheer, 1995; Martin & Salomon, 2003) , as these firms are all multinationals entering a foreign local market. While this is possible, we offer an alternative explanation based on the mechanisms that support our hypotheses about attracting more valuable consumers. We suggested that firms with prior 2G
experience might be able to recognize that some potential consumers are less profitable and choose to focus primarily on more profitable consumers (heavy users of the technology). Taken further, this perspective suggests that firms following this strategy might prefer to have a smaller market share, taking on only those consumers they consider profitable. In an empirical extension available from the authors, we find limited support for both the liability of foreignness and strategic choice theories by including dummies noting both multinational firms and firms with 2G experience. Both dummies (when interacted with the early entry dummy) are negative and have a significance level around 0.10 in the market penetration regressions. Future research on internationalization could investigate the extent to which multinational firms might choose to focus on a limited portion of the populationat least for a period of time after entry -to maximize their performance, creating a perceived liability of foreignness but in fact capturing the firm's strategic decision.
We make two other contributions to the internationalization literature. First, we extend existing work on the role of knowledge and capabilities accumulated in previous market contexts on performance in a given market. Our perspective is not only that such technical knowledge may help
firms spread the benefits of R&D more broadly (Mork & Yeung, 1991) or improve time-to-market (Salomon & Martin, 2008) , but it may also help them understand their new consumers better and target the most profitable consumers. Second, we present a counterargument to recent work suggesting that diversifying multinationals will imitate local firms to decrease the liability of foreignness (Henisz & Delios, 2001) . We suggest that it is important to remember that, by nature of their different pre-entry experiences, multinational and domestic firms will possess different resources and capabilities which necessitate different strategic approaches to the market to capitalize on the potential value that they create. Future work could investigate the extent to which imitation versus differentiation is a more advantageous strategy for diversifying multinationals.
From an empirical perspective, we also contribute to the emerging literature on the evolving nature of firm-level advantages in the mobile telephony industry (Gomez and Maicas, 2011; Muck and Heimeshoff, 2011) . Focusing on this global and economically important industry, we show that different types of experience have helped firms improve their performance in different ways, and that entry timing in this industry (given the significantly higher value of early consumers and the presence of switching costs) plays a vital role in understanding firm profitability. This has important implications for managers in this industry specifically, but also for other technology-driven and complex industries. Specifically, maximizing market share by entering early may involve a tradeoff as adopters attracted through introductory offers may not be commercially attractive as they are less intensive users of the secondary good or service.
Note that we largely theorize about and measure the relationship between pre-entry experience and firm performance, without directly measuring firm strategy -how managers choose to deploy the firm's capabilities and resources. In some ways, we presume that managers are aware of the firm's capabilities and their potential to create value, and choose to deploy those capabilities in ways that maximize their potential. However, we do provide insights into the specific strategies " 29"
that firms do and should deploy to create value from their experience. For example, we show that firms create more value from their technological experience when they can enter a given market early to align with the adopting timing decisions of their most appropriate consumers. We also show that firms looking to leverage their domestic marketing expertise do better when they use the same brand name for both their fixed line and mobile businesses. These are strategic decisions by firms that drive the value created by their prior experience. Additionally, the end of Section 5.4 above, we discussed the fact that the effects discussed in this paper are much stronger when entrants are chosen based on firm quality, as opposed to governmental edict. This suggests that firm strategy and positioning are more important in contexts where competition takes place among high-quality firms -settings where differential positioning is most advantageous to limit competition. If there are a number of weaker firms in the market (where granting of entry licenses is less correlated with firm quality), strategy is less directly important -presumably stronger firms can beat weaker firms irrespective of strategic choices. Thus, while this paper at a high level abstracts away from the strategic choices of firms, we provide some insight into the role of strategic choice in our setting.
Our study has several limitations and could be extended in several ways. First, we study a specific industry at a specific time. While we believe that the global telecommunications industry is a useful testing ground for more refined concepts of pre-entry experience, the validity of usage intensity as a measure of success as well as the differences between previous-generation incumbents and early current-generation entrants have to be identified in other industries. Industries with similar product characteristics (i.e. a durable baseline product or service and repeated purchases of auxiliary services) and similar technological dynamism and the associated generation changes would benefit from a similarly extended analysis. Further, while we run multiple extended analyses that provide important insights, we do not have enough information to unambiguously identify the true drivers " 30" of advantages. More research on specific mechanisms would provide better insights about how for example prior experience with the technology in other locations affects subsequent strategic choices.
This study looks at the role of pre-entry experience. We specifically consider the fact that early adopting consumers will be different from late adopting ones. We suggest that firms with core technological experience entering early will attract higher-quality consumers. Conversely, firms with existing marketing and branding resources in a given country will do better at attracting a high volume of lower-value consumers -late adopters influenced by brand effects and awareness. Our empirical results on the global mobile telecommunications industry confirm our intuition and add depth to the discussion about different type of pre-entry experience.
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